

HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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29 April 1959

Dear Allen,

Your letter of 20 April arrived during my absence in New York, hence the delay.

As for "any ideas about Iraq" there are not many people around here who know the country well enough to venture opinions having particular reference to that country, with the exception of Bill Polk (Middle East Center) whose reports on recent visits to Baghdad I am sure you already have.

I haven't been in Iraq for about a year. You have my last letter from there. I have no first hand knowledge of current events, but I do have some ideas based upon a relatively long acquaintance with both Iraq and the region generally. During the past few weeks I have been asked by a number of people what I thought we should do about Iraq. My views are as stated in the attached memorandum (which has had very limited circulation). You are welcome to it. I was going to send it to you anyway.

STA

Best regards,

Allen W. Dulles  
Main Post Office, Box 1513  
Washington 13, D.C.

May  
Max W. Thornburg

NOTES ON IRAQ

Max Weston Thornburg

Any solution of the Iraq problem (as of April, 1959) must be part of a broader solution applying to the Middle East as a whole, and particularly to the Arab States as a group. This is so because:

- a. The Communist threat is not limited to Iraq;
- b. Even to combat the threat in Iraq will require the united efforts of the region; and
- c. Our own relationship to Iraq (particularly as portrayed by propagandists) rests largely upon our relationship to the area as a whole.

With respect to Iraq itself two things are pressing:

1. Find some positive rallying issues around which anti-Communist forces can be organized (i.e. not merely "anti-Communism").
2. As ~~far~~ as possible deprive the Communists of the issues they now use so effectively to inflame the Iraqis in their favor.

Both the foregoing take us at once into the regional problem, because we can operate only from outside Iraq. From both points of view suppose we examine the following two propositions, as prompt declarations of American policy. (I propose the ideas, not the language.)

1. We would look with favor upon a broad Arab policy of "positive neutrality", as that term is being used today (and qualified below).
2. We would look with favor upon an Arab policy giving effect to "Arab nationalism" through the orderly federation or union of existing Arab States in such a way as they themselves decide will be most favorable for the development of free and independent Arab peoples.

The purpose of such policy declarations would be to improve our present position vis a vis the Arab peoples as a step toward securing our interests in that area against Communist (or other) threats. The consequences of these steps must be evaluated in comparison with continuing our present course (or some other defined course).

As for advocating neutrality of the Arab States, I can't see where we would be giving up anything that we have now. On the other hand we would be ridding ourselves of a target that draws both fear and hostility toward us from the Arabs and anti-West propaganda from the Communists. Any friendliness or confidence that exists between the Arabs and ourselves now would continue, and certainly more would be engendered. Recognized neutrality would offer an alternative to Communism for a vast number who are now anti-

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West for one reason or another. Besides, real neutrality is anti-Communist, but not anti-West.

It goes without saying that our actual declaration of policy would have to be phrased with care to make clear that in stating our interest in the neutrality of the Arab States we are not implying that we no longer consider the area of vital importance to the Free World and are accordingly abandoning our interests there. We should make plain that Free World interests, including our own, can remain secure in a truly neutral Middle East, i.e. one that brooks no control from outside and seeks no part in others' quarrels; but that any further Communist inroads in the area would require an immediate revaluation of the policy.

As for "looking with favor" upon progressive Arab unification (in political and economic terms), some of my reasons are set out in an informal speech I made in New York last December (copy attached). Briefly, economic development that is very difficult if not impossible in several of the Arab States now because of their lack of natural resources, lack of money, inadequate skills, population distribution, etc., would be readily practicable within larger units that permitted better balance among these factors. Also many sources of tension and conflict between States would be diminished by progressive amalgamation. Active social and economic development would tend to produce political stability and would eliminate some of the reasons for conjuring up emotional issues ("imperialism", "Israel") for the sole purpose of maintaining political popularity. Importantly, Arab unification would face the Communists with the problem of subverting the Arab community as a whole, which in present circumstances would be very difficult, instead of taking over one weak fragment at a time.

An American policy favoring Arab "nationalism", but making clear that we have no wish to impose any particular political reorientation, would in my opinion have a distinctly favorable impact upon the Arab peoples, and would eliminate another target for Communist propaganda against us.

In my opinion both the foregoing propositions would tend to secure all our interests in the Arab countries. Larger, fewer, and economically viable Arab States engaged in practicable programs of development, with corresponding need for uninterrupted oil revenues, would be favorable to the long-range security of our oil interests. In the meantime to allay the distrusts that have built up in the Arab countries against us during the past 10 years or so by making clear that we support Arab neutrality and Arab nationalism would increase confidence and diminish hostility toward us.

Turkey certainly would not be interested in a policy of neutrality for herself. In present circumstances she might very well be interested in one for Iraq.

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Iran's case could be argued both ways, but many other factors are involved there.

Israel would be safer with a few strong Arab States busy with their own development and no longer in need of that particular emotional issue for building up political leaders and promoting Arab nationalism. I do not speak here of extending Arab "neutrality" toward Israel. That is a separate issue and can be discussed later. At present the Israeli issue is a strong unifying force among the Arabs.

The British might not go for such a policy. On the other hand, what do they have to gain or lose in the Middle East that we haven't?

The current situation in the Middle East, notably in Iraq, Iran and the United Arab Republics, make it timely to come out with a clarification of our policy. Unless they know what it is we can't blame them for not agreeing with it, or for being misled by others as to what it is. What I propose is a beginning.

Now we must examine the probable consequences of such a policy in relation to the present situation in Iraq.

Earlier I said that two things must be brought about promptly in Iraq; first, some issue must be introduced about which anti-Communist groups can be organized; second, the issues now used by the Communists to mobilize groups against us must be diminished. The proposed policy declaration would tend to do both. Neutrality, if adopted by the Arabs and, in effect guaranteed by us, would provide an alternative to Communism for a vast number in Iraq who are now anti-West for one reason or another. Arab nationalism, supported by us in principle but left open for the Arabs to give it effect, again with our guarantee, would revive hope in one of the most intense aspirations that the Arab peoples have known in our times. This would not necessarily mean that Iraq must merge with another Arab nation or Union. It would mean that Iraq might become a member in a federation of free Arab States, joining with each other in their mutual interests and preserving their ancient culture and traditions. Such a goal, openly supported by other Arab States and by us, might unite those in Iraq who chose it.

The immediate consequences of such a declaration of policy on our part would be in the attitudes of the Arab peoples toward us, reflecting this representation of our attitude toward them. Political reorientations in the form of Federations and Unions and solutions to economic, population and other problems would be determined by their own later and progressive resolution of these situations, with such aid from us as they wished and we could give. But the change in attitude would be immediate.

Obviously too, an operational program on our part would have to be devised, to follow our declaration of policy. This would involve a sustained and purposeful program of explanation, using all the media at our disposal. It would involve also close and frank discussion with Middle East leaders to

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avoid misunderstandings. In these circumstances it is hard to believe that leaders in other Arab countries would remain indifferent to what happens in Iraq. They might do much, while we can do little beyond what has been suggested.

On the other side of the picture, for us to support Arab nationalism with all that term suggests -- most conspicuously perhaps a rise in Nasser's fortunes -- might react against us among those in Iraq (or elsewhere) who now oppose his growing influence. It is quite possible, on the other hand, that Nasser could be led to recognize this danger and take steps to allay fears of his own aggression.

An important operational problem arises in connection with Iraq oil. If the Communists gain effective control of the country, they are almost certain to put a high value on the continued operation of the oil company there, as a source of revenue (which they would control in fact) and as a means of strengthening their relations with the people (employment, continuing development projects, etc.). In short they would be getting a prosperous oil industry free, and with access to European markets via Western oil company transport and organizations. Ultimately of course they might find other ways to dispose of the oil and take over the operations. We should be prepared, therefore, to shut down these operations and draw supplies from other Middle East sources, thus facing the Communists with maximum difficulties. This decision would be a hard one to make if the Communists keep a nominally "free" Iraqi government in power, particularly if the British (who control the Iraq Petroleum Company) had other ideas. The decision might be made for them, however, if the UAR closed down the pipe lines to the Mediterranean. Relevant plans should be made now.

Finally, I must say that I am not prepared to accept that either Iraq or Kasim have yet fallen prey to the Communists, although the situation unquestionably is grave. We still have time and whatever else it takes to stop them. But we can't beat something with nothing.

Short of actual occupation by Soviet (or Red China) forces, such as took place in all the Eastern European satellites except Czechoslovakia (which was in nowise comparable to a Middle East country), and as took place in Azerbaijan during the War, the Communists must rely upon infiltration extending to key positions through which they can control the masses and the resources. This is possible in the Middle East, no doubt, and doubly possible because of the oppression and exploitation of the Middle East by the West during the past generation. But here I am talking about time, and it cannot be done quickly.

In China, after years of infiltration, Mao and his fellow-travellers took over locally and started a civil war that progressively made China Red. This took 25 years. But China was a country virtually closed to the rest of the world. Granting the vast difference in size, this process is hardly conceivable in the Middle East unless we abdicate our interests completely.

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In Iran, with the "favorable" circumstances created by Willie Fraser's perverse handling of the oil negotiations on top of a long period of Soviet occupation during the War, the Tudeh Party promoted, joined and worked through the coalition of anti-British, anti-government and other factions headed by Mossedegh. The Communists ran it while it lasted but were washed out when it came apart at its many seams as soon as its first goal was achieved. The Communists alone never came anywhere near getting the country under control.

Syria, that has never had a real government, and whose main heritage from the French is that the goat herders recite poems from Racine instead of from Hafiz, came under Communist influence but dodged it by joining with Nasser in the U.A.R. Today they are gone as a significant factor.

Really to take over in Iraq the Soviet Communists will have to place dependable Arab Communists (or pro-Communists) in key positions controlling the army, police, press and radio, and economic affairs. By report they may largely have accomplished this, if we assume, reasonably, that a considerable number of Arab administrators acquiesce through terror (as they did in Iran). Then they can start purging at lower levels in the Government and army. Meanwhile they are establishing "cells" throughout the population and getting on with their propaganda and indoctrination. All this they did in Iran also, and with nothing to hinder them from 1941 (Rezashah's "abdication") until Mossedegh in 1951 and even later. Then they will start winning over the population, first in the cities and larger towns. This they will do by painting the house fronts, paving the streets, opening schools and health clinics, as they did in Azerbaijan -- or, where necessary, by machine guns. But four-fifths of Iraq's population is essentially tribal (this marks one big difference from Czechoslovakia), with no house fronts to paint and no liking for machine guns. In time, no doubt, the Communists can run them down, but it won't be like taking control of the towns.

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Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000300090046-4

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May 1, 1959

Mr. Dulles:

Attached is the letter from Max  
Thornberg, which he mentioned in his  
telegram to you.

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*Rec'd 5 May - HSB*

AT

*[Signature]*





# THE HARVARD FOUNDATION FOR ADVANCED STUDY AND RESEARCH NEWSLETTER

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UNIVERSITY 8-7600  
EXTENSION 591

December 31, 1958

## CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

An unusual venture in the study of international relations is now underway at the new Harvard Center for International Affairs, where a group of experienced men have gathered for research and advanced study on the long-term problems affecting foreign policy. The participants in the program at the Center include both mature officials, who have been granted leave by various government agencies in the United States and by foreign ministries of the free world countries, who are known as Fellows of the Center, and academic, business and professional experts in the field of international affairs, known as Associates of the Center. These two groups are working together on special projects and in seminars with faculty members of the Center and other Harvard faculty members.

The Center is under the direction of Robert R. Bowie, who is Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs. Mr. Bowie came to his present post in 1957 after serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning and State Department representative on the Planning Board of the International Security Council. Associated with him and actively participating in the development of the Center are: Henry A. Kissinger, Associate Director, former Director of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund; Edward S. Mason, George F. Baker Professor of Economics and Frank W. Taussig Research Professor of Economics, former Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration; Thomas C. Schelling, Professor of Economics, and other members of the Harvard Faculty.

The need for a new approach to the problem of foreign affairs has long been apparent. Today the United States and the rest of the free world are faced with the complete dislocation of the historic balance of world powers. Simultaneously, there have been revolutionary changes in

concepts of strategy and warfare and the emergence of new nations whose cultures are different from ours and whose aims are as yet unknown.

In foreign affairs it is always tempting to study the topics of current interest. But private agencies in a university or elsewhere, are often not well-suited for such short-run studies. And in general, the research by governments on such matters is as competent and thorough as the research done by private agencies.

On the more basic and longer-range issues the situation is reversed. These often require the breaking of new ground or the blending of several disciplines. In government agencies the pressure of the more immediate crises tends to divert energy and attention from the basic issues. This often results in policy making starting with premises which are unexplored for lack of time or staff to analyze them. Such basic or long-range issues are often well-suited to outside study. Hence, the Center for International Affairs was established at Harvard, which has, and is able to attract, people with the requisite training and skills and is able to allow the time for thorough study and creative thought.

### Operation of the Center

#### Conduct of Research

The product of the Center will be objective surveys of fundamental and continuing world problems. The research program consists of continuing as well as special projects. A regular member of the Faculty of the Center normally works in each of the general areas of concern and is in charge of overseeing the research of others in the field. He usually conducts regular

research seminars in that field which include as participants visiting officials, Fellows and Associates of the Center and other interested persons. The seminar will provide a forum for criticism and discussion which will make use of the experience and knowledge of its members.

Each participant is expected to work on the study of a specific topic of his choice, either individually or as a member of a small research team. The special projects may be selected either by the Faculty or by the visiting Fellows. The Center will be receptive to all or any other projects bearing on foreign policy provided they are conducted by first-rate people. For such work the Center affords a locale for criticism and an atmosphere of disciplined study.

Essential to the work of the Center will be the publication of a series of books and monographs resulting from its research activities. In addition, the Center may publish a quarterly journal as a forum for experts in foreign affairs.

The research at the Center is currently focused on three projects: economic development, political-military problems and the economic and political problems of Europe.

The study on economic development, led by Professor Mason, is concentrating on the social, institutional and cultural factors affecting the process of economic development in the less developed countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. An initial project is a case study of Iran. Professor Mason is also Director of the Harvard Pakistan and Iran Advisory Group.

The political-military research group, under the supervision of Dr. Kissinger, is studying the control of disarmament, the policy of alliances, and the relationship between American foreign policy and security policy.

The European research, under the direction of Professor Bowie, has two aspects. One is a study of the relations among the Communist satellite states in Eastern Europe and the conflicts which have arisen between Communist ideology and nationalism. The second is an analysis of the prospects for the European Community based on the effect of the Common Market and other steps toward integration.

Over a period of time the research being done at the Center will expand to include more topics for basic analysis and more regions of interest.

#### Participants at the Center

The principal by-product of the Center will be better trained diplomats and other officials, teachers and businessmen, who will have spent

a year or more at Harvard in the middle of their careers and then returned to their posts. Thus, the Center will provide a continuing supply of international experts, both for research and work in the field.

The Center annually grants twelve to fifteen fellowships to qualified people, principally from government, from the United States and such regions as Europe, the Middle East, the Far East and Latin America for work at the Center. This year three of the American Fellows are members of the armed forces, two are from the State Department and one is from the Central Intelligence Agency. The foreign Fellows come from France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and Cyprus.

The Fellows are mature officials in the middle of their careers. Their length of time at the Center will be between six months and two years. There are no formal courses and no degrees will be granted. Each of the Fellows undertakes research in that area which most concerns him and takes part in seminars on various international problems.

The Associates of the Center, who are members of faculties at Harvard and other universities, and men drawn from business and the professions, work over longer periods of time on basic research and on specific topics in the international field. They assist with the seminars and work with the Fellows. There are six Associates at the Center this year.

#### Relation to Harvard University

The Center for International Affairs is an integral part of Harvard University and so is able to benefit from Harvard's Faculties, including those of the professional schools, the established programs and Library resources. The Faculties make a valuable contribution to the Center and as many of their members have enriched their research by experience in the conduct of foreign policy in its various aspects, the Center benefits from their insight and experience.

The Center also draws on many of the programs of the University. The various centers for regional study (Russia, the Far East and the Middle East) provide accumulated and continuing research and outstanding experts; The Defense Seminar, which has been in operation for several years in the Graduate School of Public Administration, is a valuable adjunct of the Center. The international programs in some of the professional schools, such as the Law School, the Business School, the Graduate School of Public

Administration and the School of Public Health, all reinforce the Center's activities.

Finally, the existing Library resources at the University are an invaluable aid for research, probably not duplicated at any other location.

The bringing of experts from the professions to work with scholars has long been an established technique of joint scholarly adventure at Harvard. It has been found productive in the Nieman Fellowships, the Labor Fellowships and in several of the management groups at the Business School. The method of studying international affairs at the new Center should have the following advantages: it should bring about

the pooling of the wide range of experience and knowledge of the members of the group; it should bring to bear the resources of the academic community at Harvard and elsewhere; it should assure an informed expression of various national attitudes and perspectives; it should focus attention and study on basic and long-range issues; and it should develop relations among the officials of different nations which should facilitate franker and more useful discussions in their later careers. These should assist greatly in providing the basis for a wise foreign policy for the free world.

## AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Max Weston Thornburg

Many years ago at a small oasis where I stopped for a rest there was a scraggly apple tree, in every crotch of which a small stone had been placed. I said to my driver, "Makhmud, why do they put the stones in that tree?"

"Sahib," he replied, "they put the stones there to make the tree bear fruit. But," he went on, "these people are very foolish. Anyone with good sense knows that one stone, put in the right place, will do the same thing!"

My purpose in telling this story is not that I think it very funny, nor even to illustrate the difference between the way those people think, but because so many of the things that we do over there, to produce results that we think should be brought about, would make just as funny stories for them to tell about us.

We have many interests in the Middle East. They are mainly strategic and economic, but also cultural, religious and moral. Some of them have high importance. Our primary policy problem is how to preserve those interests.

First, we must define and assess our interests there and decide what price we are prepared to pay for them. To assess our interests doesn't mean merely to say that certain ones are "vital," or that others have more or less importance. Their real value to us will be expressed in just one way; what price are we prepared to pay to preserve them? Without such an assessment we are likely either to do nothing, when we should, or to bang back with full force every time some unpleasant person sticks out his tongue at us.

Second, we must know what our capabilities are for bringing about the changes that we would like to see made. With our vast resources, both public and private, it is possible for us to produce almost any operational achievement that

we set for ourselves. That is, we can build hydro-electric plants, improve agricultural crops, eradicate malaria, create and finance industrial loan banks, build any kind of a factory, or equip and train any kind of combat force. But what we cannot do is predict the kind of reaction that those things will have upon the people themselves, or upon the process of change that is going on in the Middle East.

As for the people, their cultural background is vastly different from ours, with different concepts of what is good and bad for them, and with different institutions -- religious, political, legal and social. As for the process of change that is going on there, it is the transformation of the old Middle East into a new Middle East -- a complex and rapidly moving process that I shall discuss in a moment.

In such circumstances, our actions will not have the same effect there that they would have here or in Europe, and may create resentments or aggravate inequalities, raising them to a level of danger they might not otherwise have had. I shall not go into this beyond pointing out that to understand what makes these people do what they do, takes us out of the field of practical techniques, into the fields of the social sciences and the humanities.

Theory is important as a basis for understanding reality. This, incidentally, is why there is a Middle East Center and a Center for International Affairs at Harvard. Without such studies we practitioners might think that the Middle East peoples are slow to advance because they are stupid. We couldn't make a worse mistake. I'll leave it to the scholars to prove this by reference to Avicenna or Ibn Khaldun. I have my own illustration.

When I first went to the Middle East I was faced with certain oil concession negotiations. Friends who had been there before me cautioned me, "These Arabs are just like children. You've gotta treat 'em like children!" For months I sat with the patriarchal Shaikh and his elders, drawing diagrams in the sand and explaining what we wanted and how good it would be for them. One by one the terms were thrashed out. But these were the men who had taught the Phoenicians how to trade! I knew when they took my shirt, but I didn't let on, because I felt that other provisions compensated for it. But more than once I was half way back to camp before I looked down and saw that my pants were gone, too!

Now, as for this process of change. What really is going in the Middle East?

I say we must recognize that the Middle East is by now well entered into a period and process of revolution. We can get some idea of what this means if we recall that our own western societies went through a series of revolutions -- social, religious, political and industrial -- mainly during the fourteenth to nineteen centuries. We can't make straight across comparisons; the circumstances are widely different. But even to recognize that a revolutionizing process has started, and that a new Middle East is on the way, may save us from the error of believing that by applying a few correctives of our own we will restore tranquillity in the area. Whether the changes there will be faster or slower than in our case, no one can say. There will be factors working in both directions. We might expect that many of them will take place faster. We might expect also that the time units will be generations, and not years. We should expect, too, that the process will not take place without pain.

The early stages of social revolution are characterized by rebellion. Rebellion is against something. The creative force in the revolutionizing process is for something, but typically this comes later, and is likely to work from the top down. The Middle East peoples have vivid ideas of what they are against. For a very long time they have had to adjust their lives to almost unendurable hardships and to servitudes imposed upon them by others. What they are for, or are going to be for, remains to be seen. I don't think they know yet. But the sooner the Middle East advances from the against stage of rebellion to the forward-looking stage of development, the sooner our interests are going to be on safe ground. This is because while they are in the rebellious mood the against feeling is the strongest motivation they have.

Therefore, the first aim of our policy should be to accelerate this change-over from rebellion to purposeful advancement. How to do this is not easy to answer. But we must stop finding answers, even good answers, and sending them out to look for the questions they are the answers to. There must be better ways to find questions than that. My present concern is with these questions.

I have been speaking of the Middle East as though the entire area were a single theater of activity. This is not merely because we cannot make a country-by-country analysis in a few paragraphs. Mainly it is because, in my opinion, it will not be a country-by-country operation that faces us. I suggest that for a moment instead of looking at the Middle East as divided by vertical political boundaries, most of which are no older than the First World War and even then were imposed from the outside, we look at the region as divided horizontally. Suppose we say that in the first horizontal level we have the popular masses of the region; above that, their leaders; then the functional institutions (political, legal, etc.); then the economic level; and over them all the foreign influences in the area.

My reason for taking this horizontal bedding scheme is mainly because under the revolutionizing pressures that are at work to shape the new Middle East, the first movements that will be significant to us are more likely to take place horizontally than they are to be confined within the vertical planes represented by present political boundaries. (I except Persia and Turkey from this generalization.) Surely, for example, there is greater social and cultural homogeneity among the Middle East peoples across a horizontal level, and a greater sense of common problems, than in any vertical section we might take through the various levels.

With today's means of communication, ideas can sweep across this level and mobilize widely separated masses for almost simultaneous action. The action they take will be determined by their leaders at the next higher level. But there is little evidence that popular leaders will confine their leadership within vertical boundaries when they have an opportunity to extend it horizontally, particularly while their vertical domestic problems face them with such great difficulties.

Certainly the Middle East economy could come into a better equilibrium, and more simply, through horizontal conciliations and adjustments than through the vastly more complicated developments that would be necessary within present vertical divisions, few of which have both the

natural and human resources that a balanced economy requires, although the region as a whole has both.

At the level of foreign influences, interests are becoming increasingly regional. What happens in one place affects all the rest. This is true of both our strategic and our economic interests. The Communists are out to break down national sovereignties wherever they find them. But perhaps most significant of all is the leading part we ourselves have taken in the free-world movement toward international regroupings of both strategic and economic factors. The United Nations is an example. Various programs for integrating European interests are other examples. While superficially these may seem to be mainly strategic and economic, the fundamental principle involved is political. This is because the regrouping movement rests upon the recognition that our historic concept of rigid and absolute sovereignty is losing its old validity as the operative political unit evolves from the city-state to the nation-state and now towards the international-state. I shall not labor this point further, beyond adding that to an indefinite number, perhaps thirty or forty, "semi-independent" Arab Shaikhdoms, horizontal integration is the only movement possible as a start toward political, social and economic advancement. I have avoided using the term "nationalism" because no one knows what anyone else means by it. Arab nationalism is horizontal; Iraqi nationalism, for example, is vertical; Kurdish nationalism (since they are divided among five nations) is both.

What bearing does all this have upon our Middle East interests? From my first proposition, it would follow that the most urgent danger to all our Middle East interests comes from the unpredictable expression of unreasoning rebelliousness -- against the West, against us, against their own governments, against their conditions, or just against. Unreason does not weigh its own cost in terms of economic resources sacrificed -- destroyed oil installations, demolished canals -- or even in terms of brutality and warfare. Look at the evidence in Persia, Syria, Egypt and Iraq.

If this unreasoning rebelliousness is our most urgent source of danger, what is the critical requirement? My argument points to the conclusion that it is to accelerate the transition from the state of rebelliousness to the state of purposeful advancement; that is, to where the Middle East looks forward and not back. This would be the state of real rising expectations. In the earlier stage there are no expectations, only resent-

ful memories. Real expectations bring a sense of value to both security against aggression and to security of economic foundations.

My argument also suggests that the first step toward this transition not only is likely to be, but, for sound reasons, should be, a substantial integration among the Arab states as an effective means, if not an absolute precondition, to the social and economic development of the area. It might be argued that this integration, like the examples referred to in the West, should be of a strategic and economic kind, without involving political realignments. But in the Western cases the first unification was in all cases political, and they are now long established, economically viable and politically mature nations. The present Arab states are none of these things.

No one can blueprint the way in which this integration will come about. It will involve progressive combinations of federation and union. We can be certain that the unifying process will not take place without pain. No enduring union ever has. Vested interests will conflict and rivalries have to be resolved. The man who said that you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs might have had the Middle East in mind when he said it. But our question is, whose eggs are going to get broken? It is my own opinion that nothing would make our interests more secure than the emergence of two or three strong viable Arab nations, with diminishing conflicts between them, occupied with real rising expectations of their own.

Another question is, what can or should we do to bring such integration about? Again, this is not easy to answer, but at least we are asking the right question. In my own opinion we neither can nor should do much of anything except to leave the process alone -- unless, and until, our own interests are directly endangered. When we start defending one group of Arabs against another group of Arabs, we are likely to end by defending ourselves against both. As integration progresses so will the possibility of their advancement and of our opportunity to contribute to their rising expectations. But, until it takes place, I doubt that their expectations will rise. They seem more likely to sink even deeper into conflict and despair.

Summing up, we must define our real interests in the Middle East and decide what price we are prepared to pay to preserve them. Our next questions must be aimed at getting a better understanding of what is going on there; that is, what makes them do what they do. This carries our problem into the area of social, political and economic theory. Theory is important to under-

standing reality, but in the end our answers must be operational. It is what we do that matters.

As I see it, the operation that concerns us first is a progressive and widespread integration among the Arab states, as a foundation for social and economic advancement. Beyond giving such an operation our blessing, there may be little that we can or should do to assist it. But as it takes place, there will be much that we can do to satisfy the rising expectations that will follow.

I close on a simple proposition, which I commend to the earnest attention of all thoughtful Americans. In order to help bring about the kinds

of results that we believe should be brought about in the Middle East, we Americans had better find out where we should put that stone in the apple tree.

This speech was given by Mr. Thornburg at a dinner for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies on November 12 in New York. Mr. Thornburg is presently an Associate at the Center for International Affairs. He was formerly an oil executive in this country and the Middle East, and served as an advisor to the governments of Turkey and Iran.

## LIBRARY AND LABORATORY NEWS NOTES FROM THE DEPARTMENTS AND GRADUATE SCHOOLS

Those who receive this Newsletter may be interested to know that there are special fall Newsletters of the Departments of Biology, Chemistry, Comparative Literature, German and Linguistics, and the Fogg Art Museum. A few extra copies of each of these are available on application to the Foundation office.

**CHEMISTRY:** Ground was broken on July 16 by Dean Bundy and Department Chairman Lingane for the first new building in 30 years. It is being constructed between the south ends of Converse and Mallinckrodt. When completed in September of 1959 it will provide 38,000 square feet of new floor space on four levels, at a total cost of \$1,750,000 (almost half from the National Institutes of Health) for the building, the laboratory and office furniture, the landscaping, and the architects' fee. Most of the internal partitions will be of the movable steel-panel type, making for the greatest possible flexibility in the years to come. A unique feature of the design is that the east ends of all three upper levels provide seminar rooms, offices for junior and senior staff members, and secretarial space. The main corridors are off center, providing large laboratories on the south side and smaller general purpose rooms on the north side. The entire building will be completely air-conditioned by an arrangement that combines the heating, cooling, ventilation, and hood draft in one integrated system. The structure will be of reinforced concrete construction, with brick exterior and limestone trim to conform to the design of the present structures adjoining it.

**FINE ARTS AND FOGG ART MUSEUM:** Professor John Coolidge, Director of the Fogg Museum, will leave at the end of January for a six month sabbatical. During this time he will travel in Europe.

Miss Agnes Mongan, Assistant Director and Curator of Drawings, left for Europe last June on a six month sabbatical. She holds the appointment of curator to travel with the exhibition of French Drawings from American Collections, organized by the International Council of the Museum of Modern Art as a return gesture for drawing exhibitions sent by the Boymans Museum, Rotterdam, and the Orangerie, Paris, to America in 1952-53 and 1955-56. Co-chairmen for this exhibition are Paul J. Sachs, Honorary Curator of Drawings at the Fogg, and the Honorable Douglas C. Dillon, former Ambassador to France. Miss Mongan was also chairman of the selection committee for this show. The exhibition is comprised of 224 drawings, 29 of which come from the Fogg and Sachs collection, ranging in time from the 16th to the 20th centuries. The exhibition opened at the Boymans Museum, Rotterdam, on July 31 and in Paris at the Orangerie on October 24, in both places with much festivity and excellent reviews. Miss Mongan is kept constantly busy with press, radio and TV interviews. She will return to Cambridge in mid-January.

**GEOLOGICAL SCIENCES:** Professor Marland P. Billings (A.B. '23, A.M. '25, Ph.D. '27) was elected President of the Geological Society of America for the ensuing year at its annual meeting held in St. Louis on November 7, 1958.

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000300090046-4

An International Mineralogical Association was organized in Zurich in April, 1958. The Association has four Commissions, each with its own chairman and secretary, on Mineral Data, New Minerals, Museums, and Nomenclature. Professor Clifford Frondel (Geol. Eng., Colorado School of Mines '29; A.M. Columbia '36; Ph.D. M.I.T. '39) has been designated as Chairman of the Commission on Museums. In addition, Professor Frondel has been designated the official delegate to represent the Mineralogical Society of America at the first meeting of the I.M.A. to be held in Zurich in August, 1959.

**HARVARD COLLEGE OBSERVATORY:** Fifteen Observatory staff members were among the 200-odd American astronomers who attended the meeting of the International Astronomical Union in Moscow, U.S.S.R., this past August. Participants were in Moscow for about ten days and were given the opportunity to travel as tourists to Leningrad, the Crimea, and Central Asia for combined sightseeing and inspection of Russian astronomical observatories.

On December 1 and 2, about 100 scientists met by invitation at the Harvard College Observatory in Cambridge for a conference on contemporary geodesy, sponsored jointly by the Harvard College Observatory, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, and the Geodesy Section of the American Geophysical Union.

**SOCIAL RELATIONS:** Professor Samuel A. Stouffer, Director of the Laboratory of Social Relations, is serving as Acting Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences during the interval between Dean Elder's departure for Washington and the return of Associate Dean Phelps from a semester's leave of absence.

The former Harvard Psychological Clinic, located for many years at 64 Plympton Street on ground now allocated to Quincy House, has been re-named "Center for Research on Personality" and is located at 5 Divinity Avenue. The building, once the home of Professor Walter Cannon and more recently the Modern Language Center, is to be known as Morton Prince House in honor of the original clinic's founder. The Psychological Clinic Annex, formerly at 48 Mt. Auburn Street, is about to settle at 9 Divinity Avenue.

**DIVISION OF ENGINEERING AND APPLIED PHYSICS:** Gordon M. Fair, Abbot and James Lawrence Professor of Engineering and Gordon McKay Professor of Sanitary Engineering, served on a special assignment with the World Health Organization last summer. He was a lecturer on a number of different topics at gatherings of engineers, chemists, biologists, and administrators in Sweden, West Germany and Switzerland, and also at the Sixth Seminar for European Sanitary Engineers in Nice, France. After visits on behalf of the WHO to the polytechnica at Milan and Naples, he spent ten days at Nice as the U.S.A. lecturer to the Sixth Seminar for European Sanitary Engineers convened by WHO with the co-sponsorship of the French Government. Attendance at this seminar was limited to official delegates nominated by the governments of the participating European countries. Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia were represented for the first time. A number of Harvard engineers were in attendance, including H. G. Baity, Director of Environmental Sanitation, WHO; M. Petrik, Professor of Sanitary Engineering, University of Zagreb; Alexander Melitchevitch, Institute of Public Health, Belgrade; D. M. Zlokas, Institute of Hygiene, Belgrade; and Jan Just, Professor of Communal Hygiene, Warsaw.

Dean Harvey Brooks was recently elected a Trustee of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. He was also appointed to membership on a special Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Reactor Policies and Programs by the Atomic Energy Commission.

**BUSCH-REISINGER MUSEUM:** The major undertaking of the Busch-Reisinger Museum during the past six months was the reorganization of its permanent collection. This was made necessary by the recent acquisition of a large number of original works of art, for originals have proved far more useful for teaching purposes than plaster casts or other types of reproductions.

All of the casts were removed from the "chapel." Some were placed in one or another of the galleries, while others were removed from public exhibition and stored. The chapel walls were given a fresh coat of paint and in the windows were installed a fine group of panels of Gothic stained glass generously lent to the Museum by the Benedictine Priory at Portsmouth, Rhode Island. Replacing the casts are original works of German art of the Middle Ages ranging in date and in scale from a small Merovingian belt buckle of about 600 A.D. to a huge carved and painted altar of the early sixteenth century.



The concentration of medieval works of art in the chapel freed a large area of the Kuno Francke Memorial Gallery for painting, sculpture, and the decorative arts of the Renaissance and later periods. The Low Countries, Germany, and Sweden are all represented here. The carved altar by the Austrian sculptor Guggenbichler forms the focal point of a corner devoted to the religious art of the eighteenth century. Contrasting with this is the section of secular art of the same period. Here are to be found a choice group of Meissen and Frankenthal porcelains all dating from the first half of the eighteenth century and generously given by Miss Ilse Bischoff. Portraiture of the eighteenth century is unusually well represented by a painting of exceptionally high quality executed by Anton von Maron in 1767. This work is a gift kindly presented by Mr. Robert R. Endicott.

The strongest aspect of the Museum's collection is the art of our own century. The balcony of the Kuno Francke Memorial Gallery is reserved for this field, while frequent exhibitions of modern art are held in the small side galleries of the ground floor.

The new arrangement achieves a nearly perfect balance between the teaching needs of a University Museum and an aesthetically satisfying interior. The beauty of the interior is further enhanced by a new organ, built by the famous Dutch organ builder Flentrop, which replaces the older one on the balcony of the Romanesque Hall.

**UNIVERSITY LIBRARY:** Through a gift from the Carl and Lily Pforzheimer Foundation, the University has established the Carl H. Pforzheimer University Professorship for the Director of the Harvard University Library. Effective September 1, 1958, Paul H. Buck, Francis Lee Higginson Professor of History and, since 1955, Director of the University Library, fills this new University Professorship honoring the memory of a New York investment banker who was a leading bibliophile and collector of books and manuscripts of English and American literature. Mr. Carl H. Pforzheimer, Jr., '28, stated that the Foundation was influenced in making its gift by "the pre-eminence of the various Harvard University libraries, with all their significance in attracting to Harvard and Radcliffe a distinguished faculty and student body at all levels."

In announcing the new professorship, President Pusey commented that for three reasons he was particularly happy to announce the Carl H. Pforzheimer University Professorship for the Director of the University Library.

"It is, first of all, a gift showing the affection and respect in which Harvard is held by a family which has been generously represented among the alumni of Harvard and the alumnae of Radcliffe, and it is a fitting memorial to one who dearly loved books and scholarship.

"Second, it permits us to appoint as the first incumbent of the chair a distinguished historian who brought warm understanding and administrative skill to long and difficult wartime tenure as Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences -- and to his additional postwar service as Provost. Professor Buck has made many contributions to the Harvard community but surely none more important than as Director of the University Library where his extraordinary talents are currently enlisted in the cause of humanistic scholarship in the broadest sense.

"Finally, it is deeply satisfying to have a University professorship associated with the great library which is the center of our University, for the new chair is in scope university-wide and on the frontiers of knowledge just as the library serves all parts of our community and touches the world of learning and of mind. We are deeply grateful to the Carl and Lily Pforzheimer Foundation for making this new endowment possible."

As part of the Program for Harvard College, three members of the Widener family, George D. Widener, Mrs. Josephine Widener Bigelow and Mrs. Eleanor W. Dixon have generously pledged \$700,000 to establish the Eleanor Elkins Widener Rice Memorial Fund as partial endowment for the maintenance and operation of the Widener Library building. This gift has come at a time when library expenses are a sizeable call upon funds available to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and it is particularly pleasing to have such generous support from the family which has long been interested in the strong association of books and scholarship at Harvard.



9 July 1959

Mr. Max Thornburg  
Harvard University Center  
for International Affairs  
6 Divinity Avenue  
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Thornburg:

I refer to a letter of 7 May 1959 to you from  
Mr. Allen Dulles.

As Mr. Dulles indicated, we are urgently seized  
with the problem of Iraq and the Middle East in gen-  
eral, and I would appreciate an opportunity to discuss  
these matters with you at your convenience. I commute  
to New England quite frequently, particularly during  
the summer months, and it would be no trouble for me  
to arrange to visit you in Cambridge. Alternatively,  
if you are planning to be in Washington any time soon,  
perhaps we could arrange to have lunch together here.  
I can always be reached by phone through the Director's  
office.

Hoping we can get together soon, I remain,



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